It's day two of a ransomware incident. The servers are still being rebuilt, the board has approved a payment, and someone asks who is filing the government report. Nobody knows, and the clock started when the money went out. Under the Cyber Security Act 2024, ransomware reporting Australia obligations give an in-scope business 72 hours from the payment to report it.
Most incident response plans predate this obligation. They cover containment and recovery, but not who gathers the facts for the report, who signs it off or where the evidence lives. Three days goes quickly when the same engineers are also restoring systems.
Here's who has to report, what the report asks for, where enforcement stands, and the preparation that makes 72 hours realistic.
Note: This article is general information, not legal advice. Check the official guidance and get advice for your situation.
The obligation, and why the grace period is over
Part 3 of the Cyber Security Act 2024 created the reporting duty. Section 27 says a reporting business entity must report within 72 hours of making a ransomware payment or becoming aware that one has been made, and sets a civil penalty of 60 penalty units for failing to. iTnews reported in February 2026 that this was then $19,800. Penalty unit values are indexed, so check the current figure.
Enforcement was phased. SecurityWeek reported that the Department of Home Affairs would spend the first six months guiding organisations through reporting, then take a more active regulatory approach from 1 January 2026. The iTnews February 2026 report said Home Affairs had moved to that second phase, with a combined education, compliance and enforcement focus. It also quoted a Home Affairs spokesperson saying critical infrastructure entities had made 19 ransomware payment reports in the eight months to January 2026.
We couldn't confirm the phase dates on a Home Affairs or cyber.gov.au page when we checked in November 2026, so treat them as reported by those two outlets and check Home Affairs' own guidance. Either way, a late or missing report is now a compliance problem on top of the incident.
Ransomware reporting Australia: who is in scope
Section 26 of the Act defines a "reporting business entity" in two ways:
- A business carrying on business in Australia whose turnover for the previous financial year exceeds the threshold, and which isn't a Commonwealth or State body.
- A responsible entity for a critical infrastructure asset to which Part 2B of the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 applies.
The threshold comes from the Cyber Security (Ransomware Payment Reporting) Rules 2025. Their explanatory statement says section 6 sets it at $3 million for the previous financial year, with a pro-rata formula for a business that operated for only part of that year. The statement says the figure was picked to align with familiar thresholds such as the small business definition in the Privacy Act 1988.
The trigger is the payment, not the attack. If you're hit and don't pay, this report doesn't apply, though others may, such as the notifiable data breaches scheme.
What the 72-hour report must contain
Section 27(2) lists what the report must cover, to the extent you know it or can find out by reasonable search or enquiry. The ASD reporting form on cyber.gov.au breaks this into specific fields, so it's worth reading before you ever need it.
| Report topic | What the form asks for, roughly |
|---|---|
| Who you are | Organisation details, ABN and a contact, or details of whoever paid on your behalf |
| The incident | When it happened, when you became aware, whether infrastructure and customers were affected |
| Technical detail | Ransomware or malware variant, vulnerabilities exploited (or "unknown") |
| The demand | Whether it was monetary or non-monetary, and the details |
| The payment | Type and details of what was provided |
| Communications | Whether and how you communicated with the extorting entity |
You can add other relevant information. Section 28 also says an entity isn't liable for damages for things done in good faith in complying with section 27, which should make legal and executive teams more comfortable filing promptly.
A 72-hour preparation checklist
The form itself is short. The hard part is having accurate facts and a clear decision path while the incident is still moving. Build these into your incident response plan:
- Name an owner and a deputy. Usually the head of risk or general counsel, supported by the CTO for technical facts.
- Write the decision path. Who can approve a payment, who must be consulted, and a rule that approval automatically opens the reporting task with a deadline.
- Pre-fill what you can. Keep a draft with organisation details, ABN and contacts already done, and headings matching the table above.
- Log from minute one. One incident log with UTC timestamps for detection, containment, attacker communications and payment events. Engineers should know where it lives before the day they need it.
- Preserve evidence out of reach. Ransom notes, attacker messages and logs go somewhere the attacker's credentials can't touch, such as a separate account with write-once storage.
- Map the other notifications. Privacy breach notification, sector regulators, insurers and customer contracts. Run them in parallel, not one after another.
- Rehearse it. Run a tabletop where the scenario includes a payment decision, and time how long it takes to produce a complete draft.
Tested, isolated backups are the single biggest factor in never reaching the payment decision. We cover them in our article on the Essential Eight for delivery pipelines.
Engineering controls that reduce the pressure to pay
The best report is the one you never write. Software and platform teams shape that through a handful of controls:
- Isolated, immutable backups of databases, repos, infrastructure state and secrets. S3 Object Lock in compliance mode or Azure immutable blob storage, held in a separate account, plus restore tests on a schedule.
- Least-privilege pipeline and cloud identities, so one stolen credential can't encrypt or delete everything.
- Dependency and image scanning, because compromised packages are a known way in. Our guide to software supply chain security goes into detail.
- Centralised, tamper-resistant logging, which also hands you the timestamps the report asks for.
- Threat modelling of new systems, so recovery and blast radius get designed in.
None of this removes the obligation if you do pay. It just makes paying much less likely to look like the only option.
Getting your incident plan ready
Our secure development and DevSecOps team starts by reading your current incident response plan against section 27 and the ASD form. In week one we check whether the plan names a report owner, whether payment approval triggers anything, and whether your logging would actually give you the incident timeline and attacker communications the form wants.
You get a revised plan section, a pre-filled report template and a list of logging and backup gaps ranked by risk. If you want, we'll run a tabletop with your technical and executive teams. We'll also be blunt about one thing: don't spend on new tooling until you've proven a restore from backup works, because that's what decides whether payment is ever on the table.
If you want to know whether your plan would survive a real 72-hour deadline, talk to us about incident readiness.
Frequently asked questions
Who has to report a ransomware payment in Australia?
A reporting business entity under Part 3 of the Cyber Security Act 2024. That's a business with turnover above the $3 million threshold for the previous financial year set by the 2025 Rules, or a responsible entity for a critical infrastructure asset covered by Part 2B of the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018. The duty applies when it pays, or becomes aware someone paid on its behalf.
How long do we have to report a ransomware payment?
72 hours from making the payment or becoming aware it was made, under section 27 of the Cyber Security Act 2024. The clock starts at the payment, not the attack. Build your plan so that approving a payment automatically starts the reporting task, with a named owner and a pre-filled draft ready to go.
What is the penalty for not reporting?
Section 27 sets a civil penalty of 60 penalty units. iTnews reported in February 2026 that this was then $19,800, but penalty unit values are indexed, so check the current amount. SecurityWeek and iTnews reported that Home Affairs moved from an education-first approach to a compliance and enforcement focus from 1 January 2026.
Do we need to report if we are attacked but do not pay?
Not under this obligation, because it's triggered by a ransomware payment. Other duties may still apply, such as notifying affected individuals and the OAIC under the notifiable data breaches scheme, contractual notices to customers, and notices to your insurer. Map those in advance so they don't compete for the same people during an incident.
Australian Compliance
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Get in touchSources
- Federal Register of Legislation: Cyber Security Act 2024 (as made)
- Federal Register of Legislation: Cyber Security (Ransomware Payment Reporting) Rules 2025
- Federal Register of Legislation: Explanatory statement, Cyber Security (Ransomware Payment Reporting) Rules 2025
- ASD (cyber.gov.au): Ransomware payment and cyber extortion payment reporting form
- iTnews: Australia's big end of town is paying ransomware groups
- SecurityWeek: Australia enforces ransomware payment reporting